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SPEAK NOW: PROGRESSIVE 
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ADVENT OF 
CIVIL MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES 
Kara S. Suffredini* 
Madeleine V. Findley** 
Abstract: Amidst the political and legal storm surrounding the Mass-
achusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent groundbreaking decision in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, which extends marriage rights to 
same-sex couples in Massachusetts, this Essay seeks to maintain the debate 
questioning the supremacy of marriage as the ideal family unit. The Essay 
presents examples of the subordinating effects that marriage laws some-
times have on women, people of color, and the poor; and it explores 
speciªc problematic possibilities that the new application of marriage laws 
may hold for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals. The Essay 
contends that marriage, although providing signiªcant gains for some, is 
not a panacea. The Essay then proposes a progressive vision for the sep-
aration of certain important beneªts from their traditional association 
with marriage and for the diversiªcation of forms of partnership and 
household recognition. 
Introduction 
 Since November 18, 2003, when the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court released its historic decision in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health, extending civil marriage rights to same-sex couples un-
der the Massachusetts Constitution, it seems that everyone is weighing 
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in on the same-sex marriage debate.1 A number of cities across the 
nation have begun issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in, 
what some may call, acts of civil disobedience.2 A “deeply troubl[ed]”3 
President George W. Bush has announced his support for a federal 
constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage.4 In con-
trast, an editorial in The New York Times has proclaimed that “[t]his 
page fully supports the right of gay men and lesbians to marry.”5 
                                                                                                                      
1 See 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). Following the release of the Goodridge decision, 
the Massachusetts Senate asked whether a “civil union” bill that limited “marriage” to 
mixed-sex couples would satisfy the court’s ruling. See In re Opinion of the Justices to the 
Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004). Approximately three months later, in an adviso-
ry opinion to the Massachusetts Senate, the court clariªed that the constitutional mandate 
is “marriage”: 
The history of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, 
equal. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The dissimilitude between the terms “civil marriage” and “civil union” is 
not innocuous; it is a considered choice of language that reºects a demonstra-
ble assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class status. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he Massachusetts Constitution does not permit this type of labeling. 
Id. at 569–71. 
2 See Chris Barker, Couples Tying the Knot While They Can, The Bulletin (Portland, Or.), 
Mar. 5, 2004, at A1 (discussing marriage licenses issued in Multnomah County, Oregon), 
available at http://www.bendbulletin.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=12869; David Von 
Drehle & Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Marriage Vaulted into Spotlight, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 
2004, at A01 (discussing marriage licenses issued in New Paltz, New York); CNN, Judge 
Combines Same-Sex Marriage Cases, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/20/samesex. 
marriage/index.html (Feb. 20, 2004) (discussing licenses issued in San Francisco, Califor-
nia and Sandoval County, New Mexico). 
3 CNN, Massachusetts Court Upholds Same-Sex Marriage, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ 
LAW/02/04/gay.marriage (Feb. 6, 2004). 
4 Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
25, 2004, at A1. 
5 Editorial, Gay Marriage in the States, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2004, at A18. 
Lawsuits seeking the right to marry have been ªled in California, New Jersey, New York, 
and Washington. See Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Files Historic Lawsuit Seeking 
Full Marriage for Gay Couples in New York (Mar. 5, 2004), http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1462; Press Release, Lambda Legal, Sweeping Gay Mar-
riage Lawsuit in New Jersey Aims for U.S. History (June 26, 2002), http://www.lambda-
legal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1074; Press Release, Lambda Legal & 
Northwest Women’s Law Center, Lambda Legal and Northwest Women’s Law Center File Law-
suit Seeking Full Marriage for Lesbian and Gay Couples in Washington State (Mar. 8, 2004), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1464; Press Release, 
National Center for Lesbian Rights, Gay Rights Groups and Same-Sex Couples Ask California 
Supreme Court to Enforce Constitutional Requirement of Equal Protection (Mar. 5, 2004), 
http://www.nclrights.org/releases/pr-sºicenses030504.htm. 
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 Much of this current debate presumes the supremacy of married, 
two-parent families, engaging only the narrow question of whether 
same-sex couples should have access to the rights and responsibilities 
of civil marriage. This Essay does not weigh in on the right, or the 
choice, of same-sex couples to marry. Instead, this Essay steps back 
from the current political and legal storm over same-sex marriages to 
question the supremacy of marriage as the ideal family unit and to 
offer a progressive vision for the diversiªcation of partnership and 
household recognition post-Goodridge. 
 Part I of this Essay considers several signiªcant economic and so-
cial incentives that federal and state laws and private entities provide 
to encourage marriage and deconstructs several examples of their 
sometimes inequitable distribution along gender, race, and class 
lines.6 Against this backdrop, Part I brieºy considers how such incen-
tives may be decoupled from relationship status and provided more 
equitably. Part II examines some possible operations of marriage in 
the context of same-sex couples.7 Part III proposes an inclusive strate-
gy for the recognition of a diverse range of relationship forms in addi-
tion to marriage, and also for the disassociation of important legal 
and economic beneªts from relationship status.8 This Essay concludes 
that translating the attainment of marriage into a gain for all lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”)9 individuals may require a 
                                                                                                                      
6 See infra notes 10–53 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 54–91 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 92–107 and accompanying text. 
9 Throughout this Essay, we use the acronym “LGBT” to refer to the broader lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender community. This term is both over- and under-inclusive, 
and reºects our decision, given the constraints of the Essay, to take a relatively uncompli-
cated approach to the discrete experience of same-sex marriage. That is, we use the acro-
nym “LGBT” in recognition of the fact that the entire LGBT community is affected by the 
same-sex marriage effort, although we also acknowledge that it is inaccurate to character-
ize marriage as a primary issue for all members of the community. Marriage is not at the 
forefront of either bisexual or transgender organizing, nor are bisexual and transgender 
concerns sincerely reºected in much lesbian and gay organizing around marriage. As a 
further clariªcation on language, we use “transgender” to encompass both transgender 
and transsexual individuals; we realize that this essentializes the variety of transgender 
experiences. For transgender individuals, the rhetoric of “same-sex” marriage belies the 
complexity of their relationships and their legal experience with marriage. In some juris-
dictions, transgender parties have been able to marry legally. Paisley Currah, Defending 
Genders: Sex and Gender Non-Conformity in the Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 
Hastings L.J. 1363, 1374–75 (1997). In addition, many transgender individuals who en-
tered a mixed-sex marriage before beginning sex reassignment or transition remain in 
those legally recognized marriages. In other jurisdictions, courts have engaged in intrusive 
inquiries as to the birth sex assignment or, occasionally, chromosomal sex of one member 
of a couple and have ignored the individual’s own experience of sex and gender and tes-
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complicated approach to marriage advocacy that accounts for some of 
the interconnected effects of marriage laws across gender, race, class, 
and sexuality lines and that recognizes the speciªc and varied needs 
of real households. 
I. Deconstructing Marriage: Examining the Bundle of Rights 
 Some federal and state laws, as well as many private entities, en-
courage marriage by providing potentially valuable and unique incen-
tives to couples who marry, while withholding these beneªts from indi-
viduals and couples who do not.10 Although such incentives may not 
have a strong effect on a couple’s decision to marry, they are valuable, 
tangible privileges attendant to participation in marriage. Additionally, 
marriage carries intangible personal and social beneªts; it is “a cultural 
institution,” often read as a public symbol of a couple’s love and com-
                                                                                                                      
timony from various experts in deciding to deny marriage recognition. See, e.g., Littleton v. 
Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999). This has led to inequitable results and a sense 
for some transgender people of existing in a legal no-man’s land. See Currah, supra at 
1373–76. Some may argue that legal recognition of both same-sex and mixed-sex marriage 
will eradicate such problems for transgender individuals. Such a proposition, however, fails 
to appreciate the erasure of transgender identity that transgender individuals may experi-
ence as their relationships are categorized dichotomously as either “same”-sex or “oppo-
site”-sex, unrealistically simplifying the complexity of their relationship with sex and gen-
der. It also fails to address the additional uncertainty of whether a transgender individual’s 
marriage will receive the preferential status of mixed-sex marriage or that of same-sex 
marriage. For transgender individuals, the arguments made in support of same-sex mar-
riage often prove troublingly inadequate. 
10 The General Accounting Ofªce (the “GAO”) has identiªed over 1138 federal 
beneªts, rights, and obligations based on marriage. Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Associate 
General Counsel, United States General Accounting Ofªce, to the Honorable Bill Frist, 
Majority Leader, United States Senate 1 ( Jan. 23, 2004) (“[A]s of December 31, 2003, our 
research identiªed a total of 1,138 federal statutory provisions classiªed to the United 
States Code in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving beneªts, rights, 
and privileges.”), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. This represents 
an increase of almost 100 statutory provisions from the GAO’s 1997 survey, which included 
laws enacted prior to the Defense of Marriage Act. Id.; see Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codiªed at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C 
(2000)). Marriage carries a set of state-sponsored entitlements, including state and federal 
tax breaks; reduced inheritance and income taxes; social security beneªts; inheritance 
rights; survivor’s beneªts upon the death of a spouse in public services, such as police 
ofªcers, ªreªghters, and military veterans; family medical leave; the right to visit a spouse 
in the hospital; the right to seek the services of family court in domestic violence situa-
tions; the right to adopt a spouse’s child; the right to sue for a spouse’s wrongful death; 
preferential treatment in appointment as a guardian, in appointment as a personal repre-
sentative for an intestate spouse, for consultation in medical decision making, and for 
immigration purposes; and greater deference and protection with respect to the privileges 
of child custody and visitation. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian 
and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & Pol’y 107, 126–29 (1996). 
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mitment.11 Despite some growth in recognition of nonmarital family 
structures, such as the increasing numbers of unmarried mixed-sex 
couples in domestic partnership or cohabitation arrangements,12 mar-
riage remains the most privileged form of family relationship in Ameri-
can society. 
 This privileged institution, however, is not available to all those 
who may wish to enter it.13 Same-sex couples do not have the legal 
right to marry in forty-nine states.14 For those who can and do marry, 
some incentives that accompany marriage may attach differently, or 
not at all. Women, people of color, and the poor are among those 
likely to receive uneven beneªts.15 This Part presents some examples 
                                                                                                                      
11 Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Civil Marriage v. Civil Unions: What’s 
the Difference? 1 (“Marriage is a unique legal status conferred by and recognized by gov-
ernments the world over. It brings with it a host of reciprocal obligations, rights, and protec-
tions. Yet it is more than the sum of its legal parts. It is also a cultural institution.”), available at 
http://www.glad.org/Publications/CivilRightProject/OP7-marriagevcu.pdf (last visited Mar. 
17, 2004); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 (Mass. 2003) (not-
ing “marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and commitment to one 
another”). 
12 Some supporters of the incentives surrounding marriage may argue that if marriage 
were legally available to all couples, regardless of sex or gender, then nonparticipation in 
marriage would be a choice and it is therefore not unfair to reserve certain beneªts to it. 
This argument has a certain formal appeal but begs the question of whether it is fair to 
reserve beneªts to a certain relationship status at all. See Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 139. 
Moreover, for those couples whose relationships do not ªt the marriage structure, and for 
same-sex couples in all states except Massachusetts, marriage is an illusory choice. These 
individuals, however, continue to subsidize the distribution of beneªts to couples who can 
marry through their participation in the workforce and the economy. 
13 Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 119–22; Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek 
the Right to Marry, Out/Look: Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Q., Fall 1989, at 9, 9–10, reprinted in 
We Are Everywhere 753, 753–54 (Mark Blasius & Shane Phelan eds., 1997). 
14 Massachusetts is the only state in which same-sex marriages are legal under the state 
constitution. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967. Thirty-nine states have express bans on same-
sex marriage. Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Discriminatory Marriage Laws, at 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_Community&Template=/ContentManag
ement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15855 (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter 
HRC]. Ten states have laws that are arguably silent as to same-sex marriage, and have not, 
as of yet, recognized same-sex marriages. See id. Within some of these forty-nine states, a 
handful of municipalities are issuing same-sex marriage licenses, although the legal effect 
of these licenses is not yet clear. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
15 See Darren Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory 
and Political Discourse, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 561, 585–602 (1997) (noting that many arguments 
supporting same-sex marriage exclude race and class issues from analysis); see also generally 
Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter, Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture 
(1995); Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate in Black and White, 16 N.Y.L. 
Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 168 (1999); Ettelbrick, supra note 10; Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We 
Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender 
in Every Marriage”, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1535 (1993). 
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of the inequitable distribution of economic marriage beneªts along 
gender, race, and class lines, and brieºy considers how some incen-
tives may be distributed more equitably. 
A. The Gendered and Hierarchical Structure of Traditional Marriage 
 The traditional model of marriage is structured in a gendered 
and socially hierarchical manner.16 According to this model, the hus-
band is the sole wage earner and supports the household ªnancially, 
while the wife manages the domestic affairs. Under this model, mar-
ried couples are superior to unmarried couples.17 Some state and fed-
eral laws provide certain economic incentives only to married house-
holds that most closely resemble this model, thereby promoting and 
reinforcing its primacy.18 Other state and federal laws may withhold or 
deny economic beneªts to unmarried households least resembling 
the traditional model.19 Finally, certain critical beneªts, such as access 
to healthcare, traditionally are associated not only with marriage but 
also with employment, and therefore may not be available to some 
households with limited employment beneªts, despite their resem-
blance to the traditional model.20 These examples of some of the in-
equities that may result from the privileged structure of traditional 
marriage, without undermining the potential value of its numerous 
economic and social beneªts, provide a basis for questioning the pri-
macy of the traditional, married, two-parent household. 
 Federal and state laws may entitle some married couples to ex-
emptions from certain estate taxes, permit couples to ªle joint tax re-
turns, and establish immigration rights for spouses from another 
country. The economic beneªts marriage laws provide may include 
access to tax exemptions, inheritance and survivor rights, and insur-
ance privileges.21 The economic rights and obligations that accompa-
                                                                                                                      
16 See Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 152–60; Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A 
Feminist Inquiry, 1 Law & Sexuality 9, 16 (1991). 
17 See generally Ettelbrick, supra note 10. 
18 See infra notes 21–31 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 34–44 and accompanying text. 
20 See Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 128–30. 
21 See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of 
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447, 472–76 (1996); Ettelbrick, supra note 10, 
at 128–29. The economic incentives built into the structure of marriage are signiªcant. See 
Brown, supra note 15, at 168. See generally Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,  
Why Marriage Equality Matters, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/127.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). For example, marriage 
entitles employees to important family-oriented beneªts employers provide, such as 
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ny marriage do not, however, beneªt all married couples uniformly.22 
Some of these marriage beneªts, such as tax-free inheritance, retire-
ment and survivor beneªts, and reduced income tax, promote wealth 
preservation and may be more beneªcial to those households with 
some amount of wealth, however small, to preserve. For those without 
accrued wealth, spousal retirement and survivor beneªts may be par-
ticularly important.23 
 In a study evaluating the racial impact of federal tax laws, Professor 
Dorothy Brown found that the so-called marriage penalty had uneven 
effects across race lines.24 The marriage penalty, which occurs when 
married spouses who both work pay more in taxes than they would if 
they were unmarried, affects households where spouses earn similar 
incomes.25 African-American couples are more likely than white cou-
ples to earn similar incomes, and consequently to pay a marriage pen-
alty.26 According to Brown, this effect appears to hold true at all but the 
                                                                                                                      
healthcare, paid bereavement leave, parenting leave, sick leave, discounts on tuition waivers, 
and death beneªts. See Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Protections, Beneªts and 
Obligations of Marriage Under Massachusetts and Federal Law: Some Key Provisions 
of a Work-in-Progress 24–26 (2001) [hereinafter GLAD], available at http://www.glad.org/ 
Publications/CivilRightProject/PBOsOfMarriage.pdf. 
22 See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, Out/Look: Nat’l Gay 
& Lesbian Q., Fall 1989, at 9, 16–17, reprinted in We Are Everywhere, supra note 13, at 757. 
23 See id. at 16; see also Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Let Them Eat Wedding 
Rings: The Role of Marriage Promotion in Welfare Reform 4–5 (2002), available at 
http://www.unmarried.org/rings.pdf. 
24 Brown, supra note 15, at 169–70. The federal tax cuts of 2001 included provisions de-
signed to reduce the marriage penalty over time, but analysts suggest that these provisions 
will have only mixed results. According to Brown, most households earning $10,000 or less 
were headed by single working individuals, who qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(the “EITC”). If such an individual marries someone earning a comparable income, eligibil-
ity for the Earned Income Tax Credit greatly diminishes or disappears altogether. The loss of 
the EITC functions as a potentially severe marriage penalty over and above existing tax laws 
regulating married couples. M. Wood, Marriage Penalty Hurts Black Families More, Brown Says, 
News & Events (Univ. of Va. Law Sch., Charlottesville, Va.), Feb. 3, 2004, at http:// 
www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/2004_spr/brown_tax.htm; see also Ctr. on 
Budget & Policy Priorities, The House Proposal to Make Marriage Penalty Relief 
Provisions Permanent ( June 12, 2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/6-13-02tax. 
pdf; Iris J. Lav, Alleviating Marriage Penalties in the EITC, Ctr. on Budget & Policy 
Priorities ( June 10, 1999), http://www.cbpp.org/6-10-99tax2.htm. 
25 Wood, supra note 24 (stating that when joint federal tax ªling began in 1948, “eighty 
percent of husbands worked and had a stay-at-home wife, thus the law beneªted most of 
the population—although married black women likely worked more than white women 
then as well”). 
26 See id. (noting that married African-American women earn approximately 40 per-
cent of their household incomes, whereas married white women earn only 29 percent of 
their household incomes). 
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upper range of income levels.27 The marriage penalty appears to affect 
upper- and middle-class white households least.28 Low-income house-
holds of all races face the greatest tax consequences from marriage.29 
Professor Brown explains this uneven impact as the consequence of a 
marriage model that favors single-wage-earner households over dual-
earner households and that fails to appreciate the differences in wom-
en’s roles as co-providers across race and class lines.30 Because federal 
tax laws contemplate hierarchically and traditionally gendered house-
holds in which a single, usually male, wage-earner supports the house-
hold, they fail to address the realities of many households in which 
both partners work and earn similar incomes. As a result, federal tax 
laws offer fewer breaks and may even hold more penalties for African-
American families and low-income families of all races.31 
 Private entities also provide important incentives to marry, such as 
access to employer-sponsored healthcare coverage. As with some mar-
riage beneªts, privatized healthcare may also be distributed differently 
across gender, race, and class lines. Automatic access to spousal 
healthcare coverage by virtue of marriage may be more likely to beneªt 
those households with only one spouse working for an employer who 
offers healthcare beneªts.32 Marriage appears least valuable as a vehicle 
for accessing healthcare to households in which both, or neither, part-
ners have jobs with employers that offer such beneªts. For households 
in which both partners enjoy coverage through their employers, access 
to each other’s healthcare by virtue of marriage may provide ªnancial 
savings and choices, but may not be perceived as economically vital. For 
low-income households, in which one or both partners work for an 
employer that artiªcially restricts hours below thresholds where provi-
sion of beneªts is required, or that simply does not provide certain 
                                                                                                                      
27 Brown, supra note 15, at 169–70; Wood, supra note 24. 
28 Brown, supra note 15, at 169–70. 
29 In a 1997 study by the Congressional Budget Ofªce using projected data for tax year 
1996, households earning less than $20,000 per year faced a marriage penalty equivalent 
to 7.6% of their adjusted gross income, the highest of any income bracket. Cong. Budget 
Ofªce, For Better or For Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax, at xiv tbl.1 
( June 1997), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=7&sequence=1. Alt-
hough tax changes since 2001 have raised the standard deductions for married couples in 
an effort to reduce the marriage penalty, this will have limited impact on those low-income 
families who were already paying little or no income tax. See Edmund L. Andrews, Fight 
Looms over Who Bears the Biggest Tax Burden, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2003, at C1. See supra note 
24 for a discussion of the potentially penal effect of marriage on EITC eligibility. 
30 Brown, supra note 15, at 168–70. 
31 Id. at 169–70. 
32 Ettelbrick, supra note 22, at 16. 
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beneªts, marriage may be ineffective as a means to access valuable 
health insurance coverage. As Professor Paula Ettelbrick has observed, 
“For women, particularly women of color who tend to occupy the low-
paying jobs that do not provide healthcare beneªts at all . . . . [t]he op-
portunity to marry will [not] get them the health beneªts . . . .”33 
Therefore, workers at hourly positions or in service industries are likely 
to ªnd themselves without healthcare beneªts. 
 Sometimes, the marriage model is used coercively, rather than 
merely as an incentive scheme.34 As with marriage incentives, this co-
ercion is likely to be experienced unevenly along gender, race, and 
class lines. Coercive pressures to marry are reºected in President 
Bush’s announcement of a $1.5 billion marriage promotion program 
targeting low-income households.35 The program reºects a public pol-
icy decision to privatize traditionally public programs that assist eco-
nomically and socially marginalized communities. 
 Coercive pressures to marry also appear in the context of welfare 
and public assistance. The Center for Women Policy Studies has docu-
mented the increasing trend in welfare reform, enforced through the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) program,36 to 
promote explicitly “the formation and maintenance of two-parent fami-
lies.”37 This policy uses marriage as a public policy approach to privatize 
responsibility for poor women and their children by moving them into 
husband-and-wife households and, according to the assumption, off 
welfare.38 This policy of marriage promotion in welfare reform has di-
verted “already limited and insufªcient funding for custodial parents, 
mostly women, to fund job training for non-custodial parents, mostly 
men, on the assumption that these newly employed men will provide 
ªnancial support to their children and perhaps marry the women who 
are the mothers of their children.”39 The implementation of this policy 
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 15, at 1546. 
35 Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5 Billion Drive for Promotion of Mar-
riage, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2004, at A1 (describing Bush’s “extensive election-year initiative 
to promote marriage, especially among low-income couples,” which “would be available 
only to heterosexual couples”). 
36 TANF was created by the welfare reform legislation of 1996. See Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 
2105 (1996) (codiªed in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
37 Ctr. for Women Policy Studies, Statement in Opposition to “Promotion of 
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in welfare reform has been at the expense of resources to fund job 
training and to promote women’s economic self-sufªciency.40 
 Similarly, the National Organization for Women (“NOW”) ob-
serves that under federal welfare reform laws, states that achieve the 
greatest annual reduction in out-of-wedlock births without increasing 
the number of abortions performed receive an “illegitimacy bonus.”41 
TANF also promotes a “family cap” policy to discourage women from 
having additional children while receiving welfare assistance. The 
family cap policy denies welfare beneªts to children born to unmar-
ried welfare recipients or heightens work requirements for mothers 
who exceed the family cap.42 These policies fail to appreciate the 
complicated interplay of gender, race, and economic subordination in 
the real lives of poor mothers and their children, a multivalent prob-
lem that marriage alone likely cannot solve. In fact, for some low-
income households, marriage may cause economic loss by rendering 
them ineligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit.43 The imposition 
of marriage as a solution to female poverty illustrates one way in 
which laws characterizing marriage as the preferred family structure 
not only fail to reduce, but may, in some instances, even aggravate the 
economic and social subordination of women, particularly women of 
color.44 The promotion of marriage as a solution to poverty deprives 
poor, single mothers of necessary economic beneªts, and shifts atten-
tion away from the lack of job training, education, or government 
services for the poor and to the poor’s stigmatized marital practices. 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. Poverty and welfare reform researchers at Princeton University note that among 
the assumptions underlying marriage promotion policies in welfare reform is the ideologi-
cal belief that “the retreat from marriage . . . is a root cause of poverty.” Wendy Sigle-
Rushton & Sara McLanahan, For Richer or Poorer?: Marriage as an Anti-Poverty 
Strategy in the United States 7 (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, Princeton 
Univ., Working Paper No. 01-17-FF, 2003), available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/ 
workingpapers/WP01-17-FF-Sigle.pdf. In a discussion of data from a joint study by Prince-
ton and Columbia Universities (the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study), research-
ers noted, “Proponents of marriage are substantially overstating its beneªts when they 
compare the earnings or poverty rates of single mother families to those of married, two-
parent families.” Id. at 20. They also stated that “[w]ith welfare programs that make it more 
difªcult for two parent families to obtain support when the market fails, marriage for un-
married couples might mean more rather than less vulnerability” because of the preva-
lence of means testing in beneªt distribution. Id. 
41 See NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Marriage and Family Initiatives: Are 
They Effective?, at http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/wel/marriagefamily.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2004). 
42 Id. 
43 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
44 See Ctr. for Women Policy Studies, supra note 37. 
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B. The Primacy of the Married, Two-Parent Model 
 Over the last few decades, the U.S. Supreme Court gradually has 
recognized the variety in American families without, however, challeng-
ing the lack of equivalence in family status among these varied family 
forms.45 Federal laws privileging marriage may work to exclude com-
munities in which family ties are built on social, romantic, economic, or 
kinship networks rather than marital vows. Such laws fail to offer im-
portant state and social recognition of these communities’ real needs 
and values. 
 Some same-sex couples may be invested in the concept that love 
and function, not marriage or form, make a family.46 This may be be-
cause they have been unable to marry legally. Alternatively, some same-
sex couples may desire recognition of multiparty relationships.47 For 
example, a same-sex couple who have a child with a known sperm do-
nor or surrogate mother may wish to form a three-party relationship, 
with each party having recognized rights vis-à-vis the other parties and 
the child. Alternatively, a bisexual individual may wish to maintain a 
co-parenting relationship with a former partner even after each has 
formed a new primary relationship. Some LGBT individuals may form 
polyamorous or ethically nonmonogamous relationships.48 As some 
same-sex couples begin to enter legal marriage, other LGBT individu-
als and couples will be excluded; it is therefore important to remain 
mindful of the diversity of real partnerships and households, and to 
engage critically the primacy of the married, two-parent model. 
C. Some Beneªts of Marriage and the Alleviation of  
Inequalities Based on Marital Status 
 Marriage attracts people for a variety of reasons, some of which 
are personal and some of which are economic or social. Marriage car-
                                                                                                                      
45 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“The demo-
graphic changes of the past century make it difªcult to speak of an average American fami-
ly. The composition of families varies greatly from household to household.”); Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977). 
46 Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 153–59. 
47 Id. at 159–65. 
48 For a thorough historical and legal discussion of polyamory, ethical nonmonogamy, 
and the apparently unquestioning popular acceptance of the numerosity requirement of 
marriage, see generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and 
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change (forthcoming 2004), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=506242 (Feb. 2004) (cited with permission). 
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ries numerous valuable and, in some instances, unique beneªts.49 The 
rights that marriage laws grant married couples in the domestic rela-
tions, tax, and employment contexts are signiªcant.50 Although some 
same-sex couples may have the means to make private contractual ar-
rangements regarding property and child custody, many couples do 
not; for these couples, marriage may provide an economical alterna-
tive. Additionally, some same-sex couples may experience the process 
of hiring an attorney to contract the intimate arrangements of their 
relationship as alienating or anxiety-producing. Moreover, private 
contracts cannot grant many of the rights extended to married per-
sons under current law, such as family leave or social security survivor 
rights.51 Marriage laws and the beneªts that they provide eliminate 
the need for many such costly and invasive legal arrangements. 
 Although access to marriage is a signiªcant gain for some same-sex 
couples, marriage may not be the only means by which LGBT families 
can attain equal economic and social beneªts.52 Certainly, marriage 
need not be the only strategy pursued. A growing number of private 
employers provide beneªts to same-sex couples through domestic 
partner coverage.53 Some employers extend domestic partner beneªts 
to both mixed-sex and same-sex couples; others cover only same-sex 
couples. Whether this trend reºects a growing willingness to recognize 
non-marital relationships or simply a pragmatic business decision de-
signed to attract desirable employees, such a decoupling of beneªts 
from marriage represents a positive move toward recognition for all 
LGBT family relationships in the full range of forms in which they oc-
cur, including step-families, co-parenting arrangements, unmarried 
couples and individuals, and married couples. 
                                                                                                                      
49 See supra note 21. Marriage also carries a set of state-sponsored entitlements, includ-
ing tax breaks, social security beneªts, inheritance rights, survivor’s beneªts, family medi-
cal leave, etc. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
50 Spouses have rights to retirement and survivor beneªts, rights to take family leave to care 
for family members, including spouses, and other rights not granted to unmarried partners. 
Immigration laws also provide spousal preferences. See Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 126–29. 
51 See Stoddard, supra note 13, at 11–12 (“[T]here are some barriers one simply cannot 
transcend outside of a formal marriage.”). 
52 See infra Part III. 
53 See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign, Fortune 500 Companies That Offer Domestic 
Partner Health Beneªts, at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Search_the 
_Database&Template=/CustomSource/WorkNet/WorkplacePolicySearch.cfm&DPHealth= 
f500 (2004). 
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II. Deconstructing Same-Sex Marriage: Examining  
Some Possible Operations 
 Access to same-sex marriage may import some of the inequalities 
described in Part I and may also introduce new, speciªc inequalities 
into the lives of LGBT individuals.54 Marriage laws probably will con-
tinue to favor households containing a primary wage earner and may 
therefore unevenly distribute some beneªts along race and class lines. 
Private provision of marriage-contingent beneªts may continue to fore-
stall inquiry into ways to provide basic healthcare to all individuals, re-
gardless of employment or relationship status. Welfare laws may con-
tinue to promote marriage as a solution to poverty, shifting attention 
from job training, education, or government services to the poor’s mar-
ital practices. Although marriage may offer some same-sex couples val-
uable and unique beneªts, obtaining the right to civil marriage may 
not guarantee unchallenged access to the presumptive beneªts tradi-
tionally associated with mixed-sex marriage.55 It is possible that the bias 
that has historically operated to discriminate against LGBT individuals 
in housing, employment, and domestic relations law will continue to 
limit the rights associated with marriage. Additionally, same-sex mar-
riage may carry potentially deleterious consequences for some LGBT 
individuals, both because it introduces new forms of state regulation 
into LGBT lives and because it may endorse the presumed supremacy 
of married, two-parent families over other formations.56 
A. Qualiªed Guarantees 
 Laws promoting marriage offer a host of incentives and beneªts, 
including presumptions in child custody matters, immigration prefer-
ences, application of divorce laws, survivorship beneªts, and reduction 
of inheritance taxes.57 These beneªts are presumptions, however, not 
guarantees.58 It is possible that the beneªts associated with traditional 
mixed-sex marriages may not be extended equally, without challenge, to 
                                                                                                                      
54 We recognize that for bisexual and transgender individuals, marriage already oper-
ates in their lives in the ways that some gay and lesbian individuals may not have been able 
to appreciate yet. 
55 Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 505, 516 (1993). 
56 Id. 
57 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
58 Homer, supra note 55, at 516; see also Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 162 (noting that 
“[a]nyone who has ever represented lesbian and gay parents knows that there is always a 
gay exception to family law rules”). 
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same-sex marriages.59 Social and legal discrimination, which have oper-
ated to deny same-sex couples access to marriage for decades, may con-
tinue to operate to deny same-sex married couples the same degree of 
presumptive deference and privilege afforded mixed-sex marriages.60 
 The recent federal appellate decision in Lofton v. Department of 
Children and Family Services is instructive on this point.61 In 2004, in 
Lofton, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a Florida law barring LGBT indi-
viduals from adopting.62 The Lofton court approved Florida’s jus-
tiªcation for the law, which correlated the best interests of the children 
with “placing them in families with married mothers and fathers . . . 
[which] provide the stability that marriage affords and the presence of 
both male and female authority ªgures.”63 Even if the Lofton plaintiffs 
had been able to, and actually did, marry in Florida, it is possible that 
the presumptions created by their status as a married couple could 
have been overcome by the court’s stated preference for families with 
“married mothers and fathers.”64 
 The Lofton decision demonstrates the presumed supremacy of 
mixed-sex marriages. The deeply hostile backlash to Goodridge v. De-
partment of Public Health,65 the renewed effort to pass a federal constitu-
tional amendment to deªne “marriage” as between one man and one 
                                                                                                                      
59 Homer, supra note 55, at 516 (“At every point at which same-sex married couples 
would be seeking the recognition that their marriages imply, they would be vulnerable to a 
distinction between them and heterosexuals and thereby be vulnerable to devaluation.”). 
60 See Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability, Sexual 
Orientation, and Transgender, 54 Me. L. Rev. 159, 187–88 (2002) (noting that the public is 
willing to provide LGBT people “a certain amount of formal equality—but [there is] a 
distinct lack of willingness to rectify the tilt in a manner that would achieve full equality”). 
61 358 F.3d 804, 822–23 (11th Cir. 2004). 
62 Id. at 827. 
63 Id. at 818. 
64 See id. at 818, 819–20. 
65 See, e.g., Raphael Lewis, Groups Muster to Fight Gay Marriage in Massachusetts, Boston 
Globe, Nov. 20, 2003, at A1 (describing gay marriage opposition groups’ “orchestrated 
campaign” to denounce the Goodridge decision); Press Release, Focus on the Family, Focus 
on the Family Decries Massachusetts Court Opinion (Feb. 4, 2004) (stating that Goodridge 
represents “a carefully orchestrated plan of judicial tyranny” to place marriage “under 
direct attack”), http://www.family.org/welcome/press/a0030377.cfm; Alliance Defense 
Fund, ADF and Allies See Success: First Post Goodridge Skirmish in Battle to De-
fend Marriage Ends Well!, at http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/story/?id=165 (Nov. 
25, 2003) (stating that “the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court discarded God’s plan 
for marriage and the family by redeªning ‘marriage’ to include same-sex couples” and 
criticizing “the homosexual legal agenda”). 
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woman,66 and the ºurry of anti-same-sex marriage activity in state legis-
latures around the country,67 each also demonstrate that even as same-
sex couples consider marriage, potent bias against LGBT individuals 
and same-sex marriages persists. This animus may operate in a variety 
of contexts, including family structure, immigration preferences, and 
survivorship beneªts, to militate against the extension of the beneªts 
presumptively associated with traditional mixed-sex marriage to same-
sex marriages. As a result, same-sex marriage may be interpreted as a 
lesser version of “traditional” mixed-sex marriage, and same-sex mar-
riage may, instead, become same-sex marriage.68 
 If anti-LGBT bias operates to deny same-sex marriages the same 
degree of presumptive deference and privilege afforded mixed-sex 
marriages, the full panoply of rights associated with marriage may be 
less readily available to those same-sex couples who are economically or 
emotionally unable to litigate to enforce them.69 For example, married 
                                                                                                                      
66 See, e.g., Amendments Regarding Marriage, S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003); Marriage 
Amendment, H.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); Mary Leonard, Gay Marriage Stirs Conserva-
tives Again, Right Wing Braces for Mass. Ruling, Boston Globe, Sept. 28, 2003, at A1. 
67 See, e.g., H.B. 272, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004) (barring recognition 
of same-sex relationships and, for the ªrst time, barring state agencies from giving beneªts 
to any unmarried partners); James Dao, Ohio Legislature Votes to Ban Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 4, 2004, at A12; see also HRC, supra note 14 (depicting map of states that have 
declared same-sex marriages void). 
68 In discussing public perception of LGBT individuals, Chai Feldblum has noted that: 
The distinction between tolerating homosexuality and endorsing homosexu-
ality turns out to be key for various public policy decisions. The reality is that 
most people in this country do not believe that homosexuality is morally 
equivalent to heterosexuality. Indeed, a clear majority of the public believes it 
is “better” to be heterosexual than homosexual, “better” for individuals to be 
in long-term heterosexual relationships, rather than long-term homosexual 
relationships; and “better” for children to be brought up in families headed 
by a heterosexual couple, rather than a homosexual relationship. 
See Feldblum, supra note 60, at 186–87. The attainment of marriage may not, at least initial-
ly, shatter the perception that heterosexual households are preferable to same-sex house-
holds. This distinction may operate to deªne same-sex marriage as a different, and lesser, 
form of heterosexual marriage. 
69 This potential litigation would be similar to the litigation that arose in the era fol-
lowing the United States Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Virginia’s miscegenation 
statute in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Most notably, in 1984, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 
the U.S. Supreme Court heard the appeal of a state court order revoking child custody 
from a divorced mother on the grounds that she was living with an African-American man 
and that her child would “‘suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come.’” 466 
U.S. 429, 431 (1984) (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 26–27), rev’g 426 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1982) (unpublished table decision). The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately reversed 
the state court’s decision, holding that the race-based decision of the custody order violat-
ed the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 434. Sidoti provides both good and bad news for 
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same-sex couples may not enjoy the same parental preferences as mar-
ried mixed-sex couples, and may need to prepare, at least in the next 
few years, to obtain appellate review of Lofton-like judicial decisions that 
ªnd the placement of children in mixed-sex married households pref-
erable to their placement in same-sex households.70 Accordingly, ongo-
ing anti-LGBT bias may leave those LGBT individuals who do not have 
the practical or ªnancial means to contract outside of marriage with 
compromised access to beneªts, even when they choose to marry.71 
Similarly, same-sex marriage may enable some LGBT individuals who 
otherwise would be without healthcare to access such beneªts through 
their spouses; same-sex marriage, however, will not create access to such 
beneªts for those same-sex couples in which neither partner has access 
to healthcare beneªts. 
 Residual anti-LGBT discrimination in other critical areas, such as 
housing and employment, may prevent some same-sex couples from 
realizing some marriage-related beneªts.72 Absent protection from dis-
crimination in housing laws, some same-sex married couples may be 
unable to enjoy tenant laws favorable to married couples without ex-
posing themselves to the possibility of lawful eviction by their landlord 
based on their sexual orientation.73 Likewise, in contexts lacking pro-
tections against employment discrimination, some same-sex married 
couples may not be able to enjoy employer-provided spousal beneªts 
because applying for such beneªts may expose them to legal termina-
tion on the basis of their sexual orientation.74 Indeed, it is possible that 
the mere fact of marrying a same-sex partner could lead to employ-
                                                                                                                      
same-sex couples: the Supreme Court may continue to hold that “[p]rivate biases may be 
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect,” 
but it may require years of costly litigation to reach that decision. See id. at 433. For many 
families, such litigation will not be an option. 
70 See, e.g., Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818–20, 827. Consider the case of Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110, 129–30 (1989) (rejecting biological father’s challenge of a state law that 
creates the presumption that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is a 
child of the marriage). What if, in a same-sex marriage context, “Michael H.” was the 
sperm donor? Would courts still presume that the non-biological parent is the parent in 
order to protect the integrity of the married family unit? Even if the sperm donor was the 
only chance the child would have for a male role model? 
71 Their access to beneªts with marriage, however, would probably still be greater than 
their access to beneªts if they could not marry. 
72 See Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 121. 
73 See Letter to the Editor from Chris A., Unemployed, Homeless and . . . Hitched?, Plan-
etOut, at http://www.planetout.com/news/letters/?id=150 (Feb. 24, 2004). 
74 Id. 
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ment termination.75 Although housing or employment discrimination 
may be vulnerable to legal challenge, some same-sex couples may be 
unable to sustain the initial loss of a home or a job and, additionally, 
may be unable to sustain the ªnancial and emotional burden of litigat-
ing to enforce rights presumably attendant to their marital relationship. 
These couples could be the same couples for whom it has been pre-
dicted that same-sex marriage would lessen the burdens associated with 
having to contract for relationship-oriented rights outside of marriage. 
 In summary, persistent discrimination against LGBT individuals 
and the lack of sufªcient protections in critical areas, such as housing 
and employment, may compromise these individuals’ enjoyment of 
some of the valuable and unique beneªts attendant to marriage. As a 
result, same-sex couples may not be able to enjoy the beneªts of mar-
riage in parity with individuals in mixed-sex marriages. 
B. Deleterious Consequences 
 Access to marriage may carry deleterious consequences for some 
LGBT individuals. Same-sex marriage may introduce new forms of state 
and social regulation of sexuality into LGBT lives based on the mar-
ried/unmarried distinction. LGBT individuals, particularly those in 
multiparty or nonmonogamous relationships, may become newly vul-
nerable to criminal laws that regulate marital monogamy, such as adul-
tery76 and fornication laws.77 Although such criminal laws have fallen 
                                                                                                                      
75 Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1101 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding Georgia Attorney 
General Michael Bowers’s revocation of job offer on grounds that lesbian attorney who 
intended to wed her same-sex partner would be unable to enforce sodomy laws and hint-
ing at inconsistency of enforcing laws that could be applied against attorney’s own intimate 
acts). In an ironic twist, Bowers subsequently admitted to committing adultery, also a viola-
tion of Georgia law, while serving as Attorney General. Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 211 
(11th Cir. 1997) (denying plaintiff’s motion for rehearing and motion to supplement the 
record with Bowers’s admission). For a discussion of same-sex marriage as a publicly anti-
assimilationist act, see Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 776 (2002). 
76 At least twenty-two states still have laws criminalizing adultery. See Ala. Code § 13A-
13-2 (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1408 (2001); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-501 (2002); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 798.01 (West 2000); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-19 (2003); Idaho Code § 18-6601 
(Michie 1997); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-7(a) (2002); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-
501 (2002); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 14 (2002); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.219 (Michie 
1990); Minn. Stat. § 609.36 (2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-1 (2000); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 645:3 (1996); N.Y. Penal Law § 255.17 (McKinney 2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-184 
(2003); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-09 (1997); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 871 (2002); R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 11-6-2 (2002); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 2003); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-7-103(1) (1999); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-365 (Michie 1996); W. Va. Code § 61-8-3 
(2000); see also Emens, supra note 48 (manuscript at 10–11 & n.48). 
77 See Emens, supra note 48 (manuscript at 10–11 & n.47). 
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largely out of favor, it is not unusual for archaic laws to be enforced se-
lectively against marginalized communities.78 This has been true with 
respect to the selective application or enforcement of sodomy laws 
against LGBT individuals.79 It also occurs in the context of statutory 
rape laws, which authorities persist in using to regulate same-sex activi-
ties among LGBT youth.80 In addition to vulnerability to marital mo-
nogamy laws, unmarried LGBT individuals increasingly may be subject-
ed to pernicious stereotypes that cast LGBT individuals as sexual 
predators incapable of monogamous commitment.81 As such, the prom-
ise of integration and acceptance that marriage offers some members of 
the LGBT community may come at the risk of introducing new forms of 
state and social regulation of LGBT sexuality to all members. 
 The legal and social preference for the married, two-parent family 
model may also create a hierarchy within the LGBT community, privi-
leging married, two-person same-sex families over other same-sex part-
nership and household forms. This hierarchy could be counterproduc-
tive to efforts to diversify forms of partnership and household recog-
nition. For example, domestic partner beneªts have been available in 
some instances to same-sex couples in committed relationships, but not 
to similarly committed mixed-sex couples, based on the rationale that 
same-sex couples, unlike mixed-sex couples, have not had the option to 
marry. In jurisdictions where same-sex marriage becomes an option, it 
                                                                                                                      
78 For a discussion of selective enforcement of fornication and adultery laws, including 
the ways in which they have been selectively interpreted against heterosexual as opposed to 
homosexual parties, see Mark Strasser, Sex, Law, and the Sacred Precincts of the Marital Bed-
room: On State and Federal Right to Privacy Jurisprudence, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. 
Pol’y 753, 778–90 (2000). 
79 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1986). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 
S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (striking down Texas’s same-sex sodomy law, and, by extension, all 
sodomy laws, as inconsistent with the substantive due process guarantees of the Federal 
Constitution). 
80 State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 236 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding sentence for bi-
sexual youth convicted of criminal sodomy with a fourteen-year-old, even though the sen-
tence was thirteen times longer than a heterosexual youth would have received for a simi-
lar offense, on grounds that such disparity promoted “traditional sexual mores,” such as 
procreation and marriage). 
81 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet 19 (1990); Kara S. Suf-
fredini, Note, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense, 21 B.C. Third World L.J. 
279, 284 (2001). There is also the converse possibility that such stereotypes could dissipate 
for all LGBT individuals as a result of visible decisions by some same-sex couples to marry, 
which presumably is indicative of an enduring, monogamous commitment. See Goodridge, 
798 N.E.2d 941, 965 (Mass. 2003) (noting “marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, 
mutual support, and commitment to one another”). 
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would be disappointing, but probably not surprising, if state and private 
businesses ceased to offer domestic partner beneªts. 
 The advent of civil unions in Vermont underscores this point.82 
Prior to Vermont’s recognition of civil unions, the University of Ver-
mont provided domestic partner beneªts to unmarried same-sex cou-
ples, but not to unmarried mixed-sex couples. Civil unions created a 
disparity between same-sex couples, who had the option of accessing 
beneªts either by registering as domestic partners or by entering into 
a civil union, and mixed-sex couples, who only had the option of ac-
cessing beneªts by marrying. In response, rather than extending the 
option of domestic partner beneªts to all committed couples, the 
University of Vermont revoked the option of domestic partner 
beneªts altogether.83 Such a revocation of recognition of diverse 
partnership and household arrangements suggests that, although 
same-sex marriage stands to extend valuable and unique beneªts to 
some same-sex couples, it also may stand to reduce the availability of 
legal recognition of other partnership and household arrangements. 
Even with the choice of civil marriage, this reduction in recognized 
household options could be harmful to some LGBT families and may 
run counter to historic social justice and equality concerns of some 
parts of the LGBT movement. 
 LGBT families that do not ªt the traditional marriage model may 
beneªt more from the availability of recognition for other partnership 
and household arrangements than from the availability of same-sex 
marriage. As Paula Ettelbrick states, “The clarity that marriage arguably 
provides for two-person couples without children blurs when there are 
more than two parents, either functional or biological. And although 
there are solutions to these questions, it is doubtful that they lie in 
same-sex marriage.”84 LGBT families often can be more complex than 
the model of traditional mixed-sex marriage. Consider the pair of les-
bian co-parents who wish to involve their child’s biological father in 
their child’s upbringing without afªrming his paternity rights. As the 
Lofton case illustrates, preferences for mixed gender role models may 
                                                                                                                      
82 See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2001). The 
law provides that a same-sex couple may enter into a legally recognized civil union, which 
provides the same beneªts, protections, and responsibilities as a civil marriage. Id. § 1204. 
83 Richard Higgins, UVM Revises Domestic-Partner Policy, Legal Unions Now Required, Bos-
ton Globe, Sept. 28, 2000, at B3 (“[T]he University of Vermont has told gay and lesbian 
employees with long-term partners that they have to legalize their relationships under the 
state’s new civil union law if they want to keep getting domestic partner beneªts.”). 
84 Ettelbrick, supra note 10, at 163. 
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operate to conªne same-sex parental rights.85 Same-sex marriage may 
not be able to overcome such prejudicial preferences. Thus, to the ex-
tent that the availability of same-sex marriage may result in a reduction 
of recognition for diverse forms of partnership and households, LGBT 
families that do not ªt the traditional marriage model may not beneªt 
and may even be harmed. 
 Fifteen years ago, in advocating against prioritizing marriage at the 
expense of other LGBT equality or liberation-oriented efforts, Ettel-
brick noted that “marriage deªnes certain relationships as more valid 
than all others” and, as such, “runs contrary to two of the primary goals 
of the lesbian and gay movement: the afªrmation of gay identity and 
culture; and the validation of many forms of relationships.”86 The legal 
preference for marriage, to the possible disparagement or exclusion of 
other forms of partnership and household structure, conditions valua-
ble social and legal beneªts on a preferred relationship status rather 
than on need or function. Thus, to the extent that the advent of same-
sex marriage diverts attention from challenging the fairness or utility of 
such beneªt distribution, or results in a reduction of recognition for 
other partnership and household arrangements, it could undermine a 
broader movement for social justice and democratic diversity.87 
 Marriage advocacy that does not examine critically the legal struc-
ture of the institution and its broader social effects may be counterpro-
ductive to efforts to gain recognition for diverse forms of partnership 
and household structure. Much of the debate between proponents and 
opponents of same-sex marriage centers on the ownership of the “tra-
dition” of marriage, with each side claiming that its position serves to 
better “reinforce the importance of marriage to individuals and com-
munities.”88 In Goodridge, the court may have predicated its decision, in 
part, on its perception of the plaintiffs’ acceptance of the presumptive 
supremacy of the tradition of marriage. In reaching its conclusion that 
same-sex couples should have access to marriage, the court noted, as a 
threshold matter, that “the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to 
undermine the institution of civil marriage. They do not want marriage 
abolished. They do not attack the binary nature of marriage, the con-
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sanguinity provisions, or any of the other gate-keeping provisions of the 
marriage licensing law.”89 
 It may be instructive, however, to distinguish between “sameness” 
in the sense of being equally deserving of freedom from discrimination 
and “sameness” in the sense of disparaging less conforming expressions 
of gender, sexual intimacy, and familial structuring. The claims that all 
LGBT individuals are the “same” as non-LGBT individuals, that all want 
the “same” things, that the only way for them to be fully equal is to be 
able to marry, and that, absent marriage, same-sex couples are “in a 
state of permanent adolescence,” may serve to promote marriage in 
terms that marginalize other partnership and household forms by 
stigmatizing them as adolescent and legitimizing the notion that there 
is “no other way” to achieve greater “esteem” than to marry.90 
 Because ongoing anti-LGBT bias may operate to extend marriage 
unequally to some same-sex couples, may carry deleterious conse-
quences for some LGBT individuals, and may be counterproductive to 
the diversiªcation of forms of partnership and household recognition, 
marriage, although a signiªcant gain, may not be a panacea. As same-
sex couples begin marrying, therefore, it is important to shift the de-
bate from a presumption of the supremacy of the tradition of married, 
two-parent families to a progressive vision for a diversiªcation of part-
nership and household recognition that honors the history of the var-
ied forms of LGBT families and their needs for recognition and sup-
port. A broader vision of possibilities may translate the immediate 
ability of some LGBT couples to access valuable and unique rewards 
into a movement for social justice and democratic diversity that may 
beneªt many forms of LGBT families.91 
III. More Than Marriage 
 Current marriage advocacy and the movement to achieve a pro-
gressive vision for diversiªcation of partnership and household recog-
nition can be complementary pursuits. In her 1995 book, Virtual Equali-
ty, Urvashi Vaid observed that “[t]o win genuine equality, a rights-
oriented movement and a gay liberation movement are both neces-
sary.”92 Genuine, rather than formal, equality for LGBT individuals re-
quires a commitment not only to attaining the same social and legal 
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rights as those extended to heterosexual individuals, but also to achiev-
ing freedom from discrimination ºowing from their differences.93 As 
long as LGBT individuals face discrimination based on their differences 
from heterosexual individuals, that discrimination may operate to 
compromise the parity of the rights, such as marriage, that LGBT indi-
viduals attain. Thus, in the wake of Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health,94 the ºurry of marriage ceremonies in select cities across the 
nation,95 and the threat of anti-marriage amendments to the U.S. Con-
stitution and some state constitutions,96 it is imperative to consider how 
to preserve the rights associated with marriage not only by promoting 
the “sameness” of some LGBT individuals, but also by challenging the 
stigma associated with the differences of other LGBT individuals. At-
taining marriage may be one way for some LGBT families to achieve 
state and social recognition and support, but it may not be the only way, 
and it need not be the exclusive way. 
 In her recent article, Holy Matrimony!, Lisa Duggan offers a num-
ber of means by which the drive for marriage may be used as a progres-
sive springboard to recognition of an expanded and diverse range of 
relationship forms, rather than as an impetus to whittling down options 
to simply married or single.97 Progressives could promote the retention 
and expansion of alternatives to marriage, such as domestic partner 
schemes, civil unions, and reciprocal beneªciary status.98 Progressives 
could also begin to promote disentangling the symbolic, kinship, social, 
and economic functions of marriage.99 This might include disassociat-
ing tax advantages from kinship, household, or romantic status, so that 
individuals could direct such advantages not only to a resident intimate 
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partner, but also to a designated non-resident relative or friend.100 This 
might also include efforts to achieve basic, universal healthcare, thus 
creating access to healthcare based on need, rather than on select rela-
tionship and employment statuses.101 
 Attempts to create such “a ºexible menu of options” and to make 
critical beneªts available regardless of household, partnership, or em-
ployment status, could yield both practical and symbolic beneªts.102 
They could create choices for forms of household and partnership 
recognition that might better respond to the diverse forms that real 
households take, depending on their speciªc and varying needs, while 
preserving marriage for those whose needs and desires favor the mari-
tal arrangement. It could also address some of the inequities that may 
ºow from the current presumptive social supremacy of the two-parent 
married household, such as marriage promotion as an instrument of 
welfare reform policy and the marginalization of unmarried or single-
parent households and “out of wedlock” births.103 These changes may 
have more obvious appeal for those individuals for whom marriage may 
be only a means, or both a means and an end, to a broader goal of so-
cial justice.104 Support for these changes could also appeal, however, to 
individuals for whom the attainment of marriage may be simply an end 
in itself. 
 The current political and legal storm around marriage has deep-
ened the commitment by some to preserve gendered marriage on eco-
nomic as well as moral grounds. Depending on its ªnal wording and 
interpretation, the proposed federal marriage amendment may bar not 
only same-sex marriage but all recognition of diverse partnership and 
household forms, including civil unions, domestic partnerships, and 
reciprocal beneªciary statuses.105 This could render civil, heterosexual 
marriage the only form of legally recognizable family relationship avail-
able at the federal, state, and municipal level, and may deter private 
businesses and organizations throughout the country from offering 
domestic partnership beneªts. This approach is not dissimilar to that of 
the statute recently enacted in Ohio, which bars recognition of same-
sex relationships, including marriage.106 The Ohio law also, for the ªrst 
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time, bars state agencies from giving beneªts to any unmarried couples, 
including mixed-sex couples.107 These legislative examples suggest that, 
in some instances at least, the backlash to the movement for same-sex 
marriage may exceed the scope of the movement itself. In this climate, 
an inclusive strategy that advocates diversiªcation of partnership and 
household recognition, in addition to marriage equality, may offer bet-
ter protection for the interests of all members of the LGBT community. 
Conclusion 
 The presumed supremacy of married, two-parent families warrants 
critical examination as same-sex couples legally begin to marry. Some 
same-sex couples may gain valuable and unique beneªts from entering 
marriage. Other couples, however, will face the sometimes subordinat-
ing effect of marriage laws across gender, race, and class lines. The pos-
sibilities that some same-sex marriages may receive only qualiªed guar-
antees and that marriage may impose deleterious effects for some 
LGBT individuals108 suggest the modest conclusion that marriage is not 
a panacea. Translating this signiªcant gain for some LGBT individuals 
into full equality for all LGBT individuals may require a complicated, 
progressive approach to marriage advocacy that accounts for the inter-
connection of marriage laws across gender, race, class, and sexuality 
lines and that envisions recognition of the speciªc and varied needs of 
real households. As political scientist Cathy Cohen writes, “We must . . . 
start our political work from the recognition that multiple systems of 
oppression are in operation and that these systems use institutionalized 
categories and identities to regulate and socialize.”109 Accordingly, a pos-
itive vision of more than marriage may serve not only to afªrm the 
“sameness” of some LGBT individuals, but also to challenge the stigma 
associated with their differences. Moreover, such an approach may make 
a diverse range of forms of partnerships and households eligible for 
state and social recognition, a range that recognizes and embraces the 
reality of a growing number of families and households in our society. 
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